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INTRODUCTION: CORRUPTION AND ITS CONDEMNATION
In an era which is audience to the burgeoning increase in the
utilization of international commercial arbitration, questions that
affect the legality of the proceeding itself need to be microscopically
examined. Although matters such as breach of warranty and force
majeure are globally recognized concepts that are legally
enforceable by parties, issues of corruption are yet to be
conclusively and statutorily prohibited in the field of international
commercial arbitration. Allegations of bribery by one party upon
another have several adverse consequences; as it may not only
1
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impede the performance of the contract itself, but also may result in
impairing friendly relations between countries in the international
matrix of trade and commerce. Though there are neither any
particular set of restrictions that have been expressly laid down with
respect to such allegations nor the pronouncement of any rules that
strictly condemn the same, the global aversion to such misconduct
is palpable. Thus, international concern in this regard has morphed
into the current vox populi, through the ratification of various
international conventions that prohibit corruption in international
commercial arbitration. As a result thereof, this only makes the case
stronger to have instances of corruption prohibited in a more
vociferous manner unlike the lukewarm response it has been
receiving from the international actors so far.
The fundamental existence of law requires it to be in tune with
the spirit of the society that it seeks to protect and must accordingly
amend itself periodically. The modern trend with respect to
international commercial arbitration has moved towards “zero
tolerance” of corruption, which arbitrators have become compelled
to address.1 For instance, the 1977 US Foreign Corrupt Practice Act,
and the 2010 UK Bribery Act incorporate obligations upon state
parties that have an extra-jurisdictional reach up to a certain extent.
This implies that arbitrators who act outside the domestic
jurisdiction in such countries may need to take into account the
criminal offenses that have been stated under such legislation. The
US Foreign Corrupt Practice Act strictly prohibits anyone acting
within the territorial limits of the United States from ‘making or
even offering to make corrupt payments to a foreign public official’
in order to secure an improper advantage.2
In the year 1989, the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (“OECD”) began deliberating and discussing the
issue of combating illicit payments in international business
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See James D. Wolfensohn, The Right Wheel: An Agenda for Comprehensive
Development, in VOICE FOR THE WORLD’S POOR: SELECTED SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS OF WORLD BANK PRESIDENT JAMES D. WOLFENSOHN, 138, 140
(James D. Wolfensohn ed., 2005).
2
CRIMINAL DIV. U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE & ENFORCEMENT DIV. U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
(November 2012), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf.
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transactions.3 In order to fulfill this objective, various OECD
committees were assigned the task of studying multiple facets of
corruption. Consequently, in 1994, the OECD adopted
‘Recommendations on Bribery in International Business
Transactions’, which directed member countries to take effective
measures to deter, prevent, and combat the bribery of foreign public
officials in connection with international business transactions.4 In
1996, the OECD Committee on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises reported to the Council of Ministers the
mechanism through which member countries can be encouraged to
criminalize bribery of foreign public officials.5 However, even
amidst such progress, these recommendations mainly went to the
extent of advising countries to adopt measures by way of domestic
legislations in order to monitor their progress on fulfillment of the
OECD Recommendations. Unfortunately, while the US vehemently
voiced their support for a “full-scale binding treaty” in order to have
a statutorily binding force upon the countries, European countries
preferred non-binding recommendations that did not have any
adverse legal consequences for any failure to adhere to these
recommendations.6 Ultimately, it was in the year 1997 that the
‘OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions’ came into the
limelight. Although this convention declares bribery of foreign
officials as illegal in its preamble, it clearly binds countries to “enact
appropriate legislation”, thereby keeping in line with the essence of

3

See Mark Pieth, International Cooperation to Combat Corruption, in
PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY,
119, 122–23 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997).
4
See David A. Gantz, Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The
Emergence of a New International Legal Consensus, 18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.
457, 483–84 (1997).
5
COMM. ON INT’L INV. & MULTINATIONAL ENTERS., ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., REVIEW OF THE 1994 RECOMMENDATION ON BRIBERY IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, INCLUDING PROPOSALS TO
FACILITATE THE CRIMINALISATION OF BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS,
3 (1997), available at
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=OCDE
/GD(97)131&docLanguage=En.
6
Id. at 195.
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the treaty itself.7 The truth of the matter is that corruption involves
matters of general interest to society at large. There have been
several instances of arbitration proceedings that have emphasized
good morals and ethics of international trade and transnational
public policy.8
This paper seeks to examine the perplexing issues that arise
within the context of international commercial arbitrations
involving allegations of corruption. Part I begins with a discussion
on the issue of whether it is within the capacity of an arbitrator to
deal with a claim of corruption, especially when there is a trend of
growing acceptance towards the recognition of corruption as a
matter of public policy. Part II then delves into the various aspects
that concern the adjudication of corruption by an arbitrator. Finally,
Part C considers the legal consequences that follow from a finding
of corruption by an arbitrator.
I. Arbitrability of Corruption in International Commercial
Arbitration
The moot point in this section is whether allegations of
corruption are capable of being referred to and settled by an
arbitrator. Arbitrability as a concept is often at loggerheads with the
parties’ freedom to decide what should and should not be
adjudicated by the tribunal. The matter becomes more complex
when juxtaposed with concerns of public policy. This is the case
with corruption, as we shall see.
A. Party Autonomy Vis-A-Vis Arbitrability
One of the significant principles that arbitration espouses is that
of party autonomy, which essentially connotes the freedom of the
parties to decide how their disputes are to be resolved. Both national
laws and international arbitral institutions and organizations endorse

7
8

See id. at 215.
See id. at 213.
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this principle without any significant opposition.9 This doctrine is
often confronted by the notion of arbitrability, or more specifically
‘objective arbitrability,’ which raises the question as to whether a
particular type of issue is amenable to resolution by arbitration.10
Each State determines the categories of cases which are to be
kept out of the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in accordance with
its own political, social, and economic policies.11 Some
commentators hold the view that there is no internationally accepted
opinion as to what matters are arbitrable, as each country has its own
perspectives on legality and illegality.12 For instance, within the EU,
“disputes directly affecting the existence or validity of a registered
intellectual property right are considered non-arbitrable.”13 This is
so despite the fact that intellectual property rights are regarded as
freely disposable by the owner. The rationale behind this rule is
difficult to be laid down in exact terms; some suggest that the State
would naturally want to exercise control over the granting of IP
rights, as these constitute national assets and contribute significantly
to economic growth.14 Some countries, such as Brazil, accord
different treatment to infringement and validity issues.15 Therefore,
while issues such as patent licensing, franchising agreements,
trademark assignments and the like are capable of settlement by
arbitration, disputes relating to validity raise public order issues,
which render them inarbitrable.16 Similar concerns have been raised
in respect to disputes involving competition and anti-trust questions.
9

See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 315 (4th ed. 2004).
10
See Ilias Bantekas, The Foundations of Arbitrability in International
Commercial Arbitration, 27 AUSTRALIAN Y.B. Int’l L. 193, 193 (2008).
11
See NIGEL BLACKABY, CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, ALAN REDFERN &
MARTIN HUNTER, REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 124
(5th ed. 2009).
12
See ANDREW TWEEDDALE & KEREN TWEEDDALE, ARBITRATION OF
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES: INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH LAW AND PRACTICE
§4.23 (2007).
13
JULIAN D.M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN KRÖLL, COMPARATIVE
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 209 (2003).
14
See Bantekas, supra note 10, at 213.
15
William Grantham, The Arbitrability of International Intellectual Property
Disputes, 14 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 173, 216–217 (1996).
16
Id.
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Before 1985, for example, the position in the United States was that
“the pervasive public interest in the enforcement of the anti-trust
laws and the nature of the claims that arise in such case, combine to
make anti-trust claims inappropriate for arbitration.”17 The position
somewhat changed after the US Supreme Court decision in the case
of Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.,18
wherein the Court purported to establish a pro-arbitration
atmosphere by holding that the mere existence of an anti-trust issue
does not per se lead to invalidation of the selected forum.19 The
Court opined:
“...concerns of international comity, respect for the
capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and
sensitivity to the need of the international commercial
system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require
that we enforce the parties’ agreement, even assuming that a
contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic
context.”20
In conclusion, the differences among national legal systems in
respect to some issues of arbitrability can be contrasted to arbitral
disputes involving allegations of bribery (or corruption), as this is
an issue that perturbs almost every jurisdiction.
B. Arbitrability & Public Policy
Public policy is one term that is notoriously difficult to define.
In 1853, the House of Lords observed that public policy is “that
principle of law which holds that no subject can lawfully do that
which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or public good.”21
Others have variously defined the term as the forum state’s most
17

Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827–28 (2d
Cir. 1968).
18
473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985).
19
Id. at 615.
20
Id. at 629 (noting that the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court compels
one to question whether the decision would have been the same had the facts of
the case been purely in the domestic context).
21
Egerton v. Lord Brownlow, [1853] 4 H.L. 1, 196.
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basic notions of morality and justice,22 or a rule which reflects the
fundamental economic, legal, moral, political, religious, and social
standards of every State or extra-national community,23 something
which must be upheld without exception.
The discourse on public policy brings to light the distinction
between international and transnational public policy. International
public policy (which is considered to be narrower than domestic
public policy) is State-specific, meaning that its content and
application depends on the State where it is being used. For example,
it has been noted in respect of the French legislation that “the
international public policy to which Article 1502.5 refers can only
mean the French conception of international public policy or, in
other words, the set of values a breach of which could not be
tolerated by the French legal order, even in international cases.”24
Transnational public policy, on the other hand, relates to rules which
are universally recognized as being most basic. In other words, it
comprises “fundamental rules of natural law, principles of universal
justice, jus cogens in public international law, and the general
principles of morality accepted by what are referred to as civili[z]ed
nations.” The scope of this concept is certainly narrower than that of
international public policy, for very few norms are of such nature
that their breach would shock the conscience of most, if not all, the
civilized nations. The difficulty in identifying such norms is one
crucial factor which leads courts and arbitral tribunals to apply the
concept of international public policy as conceived by a particular
State, which is, more often than not, the seat of the arbitral tribunal
(lex loci arbitri) in matters of arbitrability.25
Arbitrability and public policy have a close connection. The
relation is founded on the premise that public policy refers to
imperative rules of a State or transnational community and the issues
related thereto have a significant bearing on the public at large. The
22

See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du
Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d. Cir. 1974).
23
See LEW, MISTELIS & KROLL, supra note 13, at 422.
24
FOUCHARD GALLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION §1648 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999).
25
Loukas A. Mistelis, Is Arbitrability a National or an International Law
Issue?, in ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 1,
13 (Loukas A. Mistelis & Stavros L. Brekoulakis eds., 2009).
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element of public interest makes such issues incapable of reference
to a private settlement process.26
The case of Silica Investors Ltd. v. Tomolugen Holdings Ltd.,27
decided by the High Court of Singapore, is particularly relevant at
this juncture. Parties entered into a share sale agreement which, inter
alia, had an arbitration clause. The plaintiff brought a minority
oppression claim against the defendants, seeking relief in the nature
of a buyout order and an order for winding up of the company. The
defendants applied for a stay of the proceedings, which was denied
by the court, and the defendants proceeded to appeal. One of the
issues at hand was whether the plaintiff’s claim was arbitrable. The
High Court found that the claim certainly fell within the scope of the
terms of the arbitration clause, namely, “arising out of or in
connection with this Agreement.” However, this should not mean
that the matter was necessarily arbitrable.
The Court analyzed the position of law in England (where a
minority oppression claim is arbitrable, though the scope of the
relief sought would be limited in cases where the interests of the
other shareholders would be affected), Australia (where the said
claim is arbitrable in so far as the remedies sought are inter partes
and not in rem), and Canada (where the issue is unsettled).
Thereafter, it observed with respect to the law in Singapore that no
general conclusion could be reached. However“...many if not most of the minority oppression claims under
s. 216 of the CA [Companies Act], claims will be nonarbitrable. This will often be in cases where, e.g., there are
other shareholders who are not parties to the arbitration, or
the arbitral award will directly affect third parties or the
general public, or some claims fall within the scope of the
arbitration clause and some do not, or there are overtones of
insolvency, or the remedy or relief that is sought is one that
an arbitral tribunal is unable to make.”28
26

See James D. Fry, Désordre Public International Under the New York
Convention: Wither Truly International Public Policy, CHINESE J. INT’L L., 81,
85 (2009).
27
See generally Silica Investors Ltd. v. Tomolugen Holdings Ltd., [2014]SGHC
101 (Sing.).
28
Companies Act 2006, §142 (Eng.).
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The above illustration shows that courts would refuse to uphold
arbitrability in a matter that has ramifications on the interests of the
parties, such that the dispute would no longer remain a private one.
There may, however, be situations where arbitrability and
public policy do not overlap, as can be understood from the
instances mentioned in the previous section. Thus, disputes relating
to intellectual property rights might be regarded by a State to be
within exclusive judicial jurisdiction, though such disputes may not
have any impact whatsoever on the public interest. This distinction
can be clearly seen in the New York Convention.29 Article V lists
out the grounds upon which the recognition and enforcement of an
arbitral award may be refused. The second part of this Article
provides for two grounds which, if found by the Court upon an
application of a party or otherwise, the award could be set aside.
These are (a) the subject-matter of the dispute in question is nonarbitrable, or (b) the recognition or enforcement of the award is
contrary to public policy.30 Therefore, laws restricting arbitrability
may not form part of the mandatory rules of public policy.
The following section discusses how the public policy
exception to arbitrability is applied to cases pertaining to corruption.
C. Corruption And The Exception of Public Policy to
Arbitrability
Anyone engaged in cross-border or international commercial
transactions would acknowledge that corruption and bribery are
worldwide problems that plague good governance and seriously
impede performance of commercial agreements.31 An estimate by
the World Economic Forum shows that the cost of corruption comes
to more than 5% of the global GDP (around US$ 2.6 trillion),
thereby escalating the cost of doing business by nearly 10%

29

See generally Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter
New York Convention].
30
See id. art. V(2).
31
William Fox, Adjudicating Bribery and Corruption Issues in International
Commercial Arbitration, 27 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 487, 487 (2009).
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globally.32 In the public sector, funds contributed by the people end
up in private pockets and thereby adversely affecting growth,
infrastructure, and public services. It is precisely because of these
reasons why corruption is forbidden by a number of international
conventions, especially the United Nations Convention against
Corruption33 and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.34
Arbitration law has witnessed a head on collision between
corruption and public policy. One instance is the famous 1963 ICC
Award35 authored by Judge Lagergren. The case concerned a public
works contract, wherein an Argentinean agent was supposed to
receive a “commission” from the Respondent (a company that was
competing for a certain contract), in return for his exertion of
influence on Argentinean government officials at that point in time.
The company refused to pay, thereby triggering a dispute between
the parties. The learned Judge observed that although the relevant
documents bore semblance to an ordinary legal commercial
agreement, the evidence revealed that a substantial part of the
commission was to be used for bribes. Accordingly, the arbitrator
had no jurisdiction with respect to the matter, as contracts which
seriously violate bonos mores or international public policy are
unenforceable to say the least, and as such, cannot be sanctioned by
courts or arbitrators. Therefore, it was held:
“Whether one is taking the point of view of good
government or that of commercial ethics it is impossible to
close one's eyes to the probable destination of amounts of
this magnitude, and to the destructive effect thereof on the
32
Global Agenda Council, Anti-Corruption, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM,
http://reports.weforum.org/global-agenda-council-2012/councils/anticorruption/, (2012–2013).
33
G. A. Res. 58/4, United Nations Convention Against Corruption, (Oct. 31,
2003). (As of July 2010, there are 146 parties to this Convention).
34
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT.
WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS,
CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS : AND RELATED DOCUMENTS
(OECD) (1998).
35
See generally Case No. 1110 of 1963, 10 Arb. Int’l 282 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb,).
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business pattern with consequent impairment of industrial
progress. Such corruption is an international evil; it is
contrary to good morals and to an international public policy
common to the community of nations.”36
This principle was reiterated in the World Duty Free case,37
wherein the Tribunal noted that bribery is contrary to the
international public policy of most, if not all, States.
Over the years, however, owing to the doctrine of separability,
there has been general acceptance, both nationally and
internationally, that an allegation of bribery does not itself deprive
the arbitrator of jurisdiction over the dispute.38 In one case, it was
noted that even though the arbitrators were well aware of the
allegations that commitments made by public-sector entities in
respect to certain major projects were devoid of economic
contribution to public welfare, such allegations are required to be
proven, which in this case, was not done.39 Recent case law is in
tune with this precedent, allowing an arbitrator to rule on illegality
for bribery. Once bribery is proven, the tribunal declares the contract
unenforceable. One author has stated:
“If an allegation of corruption is made in plain language in
the course of arbitration proceedings, the arbitral tribunal is
clearly under a duty to consider the allegation and to decide
whether or not it is proved...A failure to address the
existence of such illegality may threaten the enforceability
of the award, and thus may sit uncomfortably with an arbitral
tribunal’s duty to under some modern rules of arbitration to
use its best endeavors to ensure that it’s award is
enforceable.”40
36

Id. at 20.
World Duty Free Company Ltd. v. The Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/7, Award (October 4, 2006).
38
See ALAN REDFERN, MARTIN HUNTER, NIGEL BLACKABY & CONSTANTINE
PARTASIDES, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 143 (2004).
39
Final Award of 4 May 1999, Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. Perusahaan
Listruik Negara, 25 ICCA Y.B. Comm.l Arb., 13, 44 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.).
40
REDFERN, HUNTER, BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 38, at 144.
37
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The rationale behind this approach is simple: when parties
choose to refer their disputes to an arbitral tribunal, they cannot be
presumed to intend that the issue of validity be decided by a court.
The House of Lords held in Fiona that “very clear language” would
need to be found before deciding that the parties had such an
intention.41 “If arbitrators can decide whether a contract is void for
initial illegality, there is no reason why they should not decide
whether a contract has been procured by bribery, just as much as
they can decide whether a contract has been procured by
misrepresentation or non-disclosure.”42
Many contemporary thinkers are of the view that arbitration is
a normal forum, if not the juge naturel, as far as cross-border
transactions are concerned.43 In such a scenario, it is inappropriate
to hold that arbitrators are incapable of dealing with issues where
public interest or protection of weaker parties44 is involved, or that
arbitrators are insensitive to considerations of equity.45
II. Adjudicating
Arbitration

Bribery

in

International

Commercial

On an international level, the mere allegation of corruption
made by one party against the other bears immense gravity as it is
likely to have an adverse effect on the reputation of a State party.
This nuanced situation becomes more pronounced when understood
within the context of international commercial arbitration.
When it comes to scrutinizing evidence with respect to
issues of corruption in the field of international commercial
arbitration, three points of consideration need to be taken into
account. First, there exists the possibility of an adverse effect on the
rule of burden of proof. Second, indirect evidence needs to be
41

See Fiona Trust Holding Corp v. Privalov, [2007] 4 All ER 951 (HL) (Eng.).
Id.
43
See Yves Derains, Chroniques de Sentences Arbitrales, 105 JOURNAL DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL (CLUNET), 976 (1978).
44
See Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v. Richards, [2011] EWCA (Civ) 855,
[333] (Eng.) (stating that in England, for instance, issues pertaining to rights of
minority shareholders can be dealt with by an arbitrator).
45
See Pierre Mayer, La règle morale dans l’arbitrage international, in PIERRE
BELLET, ETUDES OFFERTES À PIERRE BELLET (1991).
42
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critically evaluated and thereafter, permitted to be brought before
the tribunal. Third, there is an urgent need to strengthen the standard
of proof in cases of serious allegations, especially where concerns
of public policy, fraud, or corruption are at issue.
Thus, it is not without reason that there has been considerable
debate on the issue of evidence brought forth by parties before the
tribunal. In circumstances when there is a prima facie suggestion of
corruption and neither party brings forth any allegations of such
wrongdoing, the question remains whether tribunals are legally
empowered to inquire into issues of corruption sua sponte.
Moreover, the requisite standard of proof that needs to be
discharged, in order to successfully prove a case of corruption, needs
to be conclusively determined, as the integrity and fairness of the
arbitral process are regarded as paramount.
With this background, this article will now examine the various
evidentiary issues pertaining to both international commercial
arbitration, and arbitration in general.
A. Evidence-Taking Mechanisms in Arbitration
The procedure for submitting and disclosing evidentiary
materials plays an essential role in international commercial
arbitration, as “fact-finding” is one of the primary functions of
arbitral tribunals. While courts in most civil law jurisdictions do not
provide for party-initiated disclosure of evidence, common law
jurisdictions derive their genesis from the adversarial system of
justice and strictly adhere to the party-initiated disclosure process.46
At the international level, certain rules have been developed to
address the evidence-taking mechanism irrespective of the legal
system. Article 20 of the ICC arbitration rules provides that the
tribunal shall proceed within as short a time as possible in order to
establish the facts of the case by “all appropriate means.”47 The term
“all appropriate means” implies that the tribunal is endowed with
46

Claudia T. Salomon & Sandra Friedrich, Obtaining and Submitting Evidence
in International Arbitration in the United States, 24 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 549,
550 (2013).
47
THE CHAMBER OF ARBITRATION OF MILAN RULES: A COMMENTARY 546
(Ugo Draetta & Riccardo Luzzatto eds., 2012).
13

CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

flexibility in taking evidence from concerned parties. However,
even the slightest possibility of misinterpreting such ambiguity can
adversely impact the judicious nature of arbitration proceedings
itself. Meanwhile, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provide that at
any time during the arbitral proceedings, the tribunal may require
the parties to produce documents, exhibits or other evidence within
a definite period of time that shall be determined at the discretion of
the tribunal.48
The International Bar Association has also placed an emphasis
upon the quality of evidence that ought to be presented by the parties
and has implemented Rules on the Taking of Evidence in
International Commercial Arbitration which, inter alia, state that
every Party is entitled to know, reasonably in advance, of the
evidence upon which the other Parties rely.49 This permits the other
Party to prepare his defense and expedites the entire proceeding in a
fair and transparent manner. While Article 3 of the IBA Rules
provides for the discovery and production of documents, Article 4
permits a party to obtain the testimony of voluntary witnesses or
persons who will not appear voluntarily.
Though these rules are not precise in a ‘mandatory’ sense for
any particular international arbitration institution to follow, it is
ultimately up to the will of the parties to incorporate the rules in the
arbitration clause that governs their commercial relationship.
B. Rules Governing Adjudication of Bribery
Though the “choice of law” provision is still made available to
the parties, the risk associated with such liberty is that it gives them
the autonomy to choose a law that may not be as stringent with
certain forms of bribery in international commercial arbitration as it
ought to be. As a form of practice, the arbitral tribunal does observe
the mandatory rules of the country where the contract between the
two parties is performed. However, those rules that specifically seek
to protect legitimate goals will be placed on a higher pedestal than
48

CHRISTOPHER DUGAN DON WALLACE, NOAH RUBINS & BORZU SABAHI,
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 161 (2011).
49
Anna Magdalena Kubalczyk, Evidentiary Rules in International Arbitration:
A Comparative Analysis of Approaches and the Need for Regulation, 3
GRONINGEN J. INT’L L. 85, 107 (2015).
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other rules. For instance, a provision of lex loci solutionis, which
seeks to impose an indiscriminate ban upon intermediaries, is less
likely to be enforced in the field of international commercial
arbitration than an internationally condemned act such as private
bribery. This proposition follows from the fact that as a matter of
practice and principle, transnational beliefs that find support from a
majority of countries ought to be given much more importance than
domestic beliefs in order to accommodate an ‘international’ stance
within the system of commercial arbitration itself. Another aspect
that is worthy of attention is the fact that there needs to be a
sufficient nexus between lex arbitri and the case itself; this implies
that the concerned case must expressly affect public interest in a
manifest manner.50
C. Burden and Standard of Proof
Commentators belonging to various jurisdictions have different
views as to which law should be applied to determine the standard
of proof related to proving corruption. While some argue that the
substantive law chosen by the parties should govern the same,51
others suggest that the applicable procedural rules are more
appropriate.52 There are, however, various rules that have a general
application irrespective of the governing law. Evaluation of
evidence is done on the basis of these rules as per the discretion of
the arbitrator.
Very few rules deal with the issue of burden and standard of
proof in international arbitration. One of them is the 2013
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, wherein it is provided that each
party shall have the burden of proving the facts relied upon to
support its claim or defense.53 However, a vexing factor in proving
50

Vladimir Pavic, Bribery and International Commercial Arbitration: The Role
of Mandatory Rules and Public Policy, 43 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV.
661, 676 (2012).
51
KLAUS PETER BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 444–50
(1993).
52
Haugeneder & Liebscher, Chapter V: Investment Arbitration: Corruption and
Investment Arbitration: Substantive Standards and Proof, in AUSTRIAN
ARBITRATION YEARBOOK 2009 539, 545 (Christian Klausegger, et al. eds.,
2009).
53
G.A. Res. 68/109, art. 27 (December 16, 2013).
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corruption is that, like most crimes and cases of grave or fraudulent
misconduct, corruption is specifically designed not to be detected.54
Various arbitral tribunals have expressed the view that it is
“notoriously difficult” to prove corruption, for there is little or no
physical evidence in relation thereto.55 In such a situation, placing
the burden of proof on the party alleging so might be too onerous.
At the same time, the rule that a party must prove the facts upon
which it bases its claim is regarded as a rule of natural justice and
due process.56 Indeed, the existence of this principle is necessary to
negate the possibility of parties making groundless allegations
against each other, particularly when the party seeks to prove a
startling proposition, such as corruption.57
The problem with corruption is that even if the circumstances
are suspicious, it is difficult to meet a high standard of proof. In a
majority of cases, it has been propounded that the usual standard of
“preponderance of probabilities” is sufficient in circumstances of
corruption.58 On the other hand, the principle of “clear and
convincing evidence” has been proposed in adjudication of
corruption, as demonstrated in the case of Dadras v. Iran, where the
arbitral tribunal opined that the applicability of this principle finds
support in both American and English law, according to which cases
of fraudulent behavior mandate a higher standard of proof.59 In
similar terms, the arbitral tribunal in the famous Westinghouse case
noted that matters like fraud must be proven to exist by clear and
54
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convincing evidence, and cannot be justified by mere speculation
because of the seriousness of the allegations.60 The bar was raised
in the Hilmarton case, where the tribunal reasoned that it was
necessary for the party to prove bribery beyond doubt, although it
could be done by indirect evidence.61 One might argue that such
standard of proof is required only in criminal cases because they
entail penal consequences, something which an arbitrator cannot
sanction, and therefore, applying such a standard in arbitration is
unwarranted. Constantine Partasides has argued that arbitral
tribunals should ordinarily adopt a balanced approach, neither
relaxing the standard of proof nor making it severe for a party to
discharge the burden.62
A significant aspect in this discourse is the circumstance of the
case. If the arbitrator notices, on the basis of the facts presented
before them, that there are some “red flags” pointing towards to the
existence of corruption, it may call upon the other party to explain
them, and on its failure to do so, draw an adverse inference against
the other party.63 The Resource Guide to the 1977 US Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act has provided illustrations of “red flags,” some
of them being unusual payment patterns, history of corruption in the
country, lack of transparency in books of accounts, lack of
qualifications on the part of the service-provider, and so on.64
Such a situation took place in the case of Metal-Tech Ltd. v.
Republic of Uzbekistan.65 The facts of the case brought to light
60
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certain “red flags” such as lack of requisite qualifications of the
consultants, exorbitant “remuneration” paid to such consultants, and
close relations with high level government officials, including the
President and the Prime Minister of Uzbekistan. Moreover, the party
against whom corruption was alleged did not offer any explanation
on how exactly the consultants provided support to Metal-Tech’s
investment.66 Accordingly, the tribunal held that though there was
no direct proof, the unexplained circumstances were such that they
led to the conclusion that bribery had actually been committed.67
In light of the foregoing discussion, the authors submit that the
burden of proof must lie with the person alleging that the contract in
question is tainted with bribery, as is the case with other forms of
illegality. The authors also believe that there must certainly be a
higher standard of proof than a mere preponderance of probabilities
in regards to a sensitive issue like corruption. However, such
standard should not be as high as “beyond doubt” for the simple
reason that this would allow the wrongdoers to escape the clutches
of the law, considering the paucity of evidence that exists in such
cases. It must, therefore, lie somewhere between the two.68
D. Sua Sponte Investigation of Bribery by Arbitration
Another issue that has been in controversy is whether an
arbitrator can initiate, sua sponte, an investigation of bribery. It is
not always the case that one of the parties comes forward with a
specific allegation of corruption against the other. There could be a
situation where suspicious circumstances come to the attention of
the arbitral tribunal as the arbitration proceedings progress. Thus,
the question to be addressed at this juncture is whether it is possible
for an arbitral tribunal to investigate possible bribery on its own
accord, without there being any such specific allegation from either
party? On the one hand, it is argued that the essence of arbitration is
the will of the parties to refer specific issues to such private
adjudication, and therefore, an arbitrator cannot stray into an ultra
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petita area69 and impose his own will onto proceedings by inquiring
into a matter not brought before the tribunal. If the arbitrator does
so, the award passed by him may be set aside70 or refused
recognition and enforcement71 on the grounds that the tribunal
exceeded its authority.
On the other hand, if arbitral awards are as binding as a decision
rendered by a court,72 it is imperative that the arbitral tribunal treats
such matters in the same manner as a court, and its failure to do so
would be tantamount to endorsing bribery.73 The argument that an
arbitrator would exceed his mandate by ruling upon the existence
and consequences of corruption is also challenged by some who
contend that a suspected or manifest illegality, which is relevant to
the claims or defenses cannot be isolated. It was observed by the
Singapore Court of Appeal in the case of CRW Joint Operation v.
PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK that in determining
whether an arbitrator has exceeded his authority in considering and
deciding a particular matter, its relevance to the issues submitted by
the parties to the tribunal for resolution is a crucial factor to be
considered.74
The authors agree with the latter approach. Even though
arbitration is a creature of contract, an arbitral tribunal cannot ignore
international condemnation of bribery. It is difficult to ignore the
tribunal’s comment in Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. PLN,
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that the members of an arbitral tribunal do not live in an ivory tower,
and that the arbitral process cannot be divorced from reality.75 A
tribunal must remain vigilant and check for the possibility of corrupt
dealings by one or both parties to arbitration. Any failure or laxity
in this regard may open the arbitral award to annulment or nonrecognition,76 or may hold the arbitrator liable for failure to act.77
Therefore, it should be within an arbitrator’s mandate to make
investigation sua sponte if he or she is of the opinion that some
corrupt activities are afoot, provided such activities have nexus with
the matters which have been referred to arbitration.
III. Consequences of a Finding of Corruption
The dilemma of an arbitrator does not end at the issues of
arbitrability and standard of proof required in the case of corruption.
Once a finding of corruption has been reached, either upon the
evidence led by the alleging party or upon a sua sponte
investigation, the arbitrator also has to decide the consequences of
such finding on the contract itself, and ultimately, on the respective
claims of the parties.
Most domestic legal systems recognize a distinction between
contracts aimed at corruption (either expressly or impliedly) and
ones procured by corruption. In the former case, there is unanimity
among various jurisdictions that the contract must be declared null
and void.78 Such a consequence is not only contemplated by national
75
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laws and international conventions, but it is also regarded as a matter
of transnational policy.79 On the other hand, a contract procured by
corruption remains valid until the aggrieved party takes steps
towards its annulment.80 In World Duty Free v. Kenya, the investor
invoked ICSID arbitration wherein they admitted to have paid $2
million as a “donation” to the President of Kenya in order to do
business with the Kenyan Government.81 The arbitrator, relying on
English law, which was the governing law of the contract, held that
the contract was voidable at the option of Kenya, as it was procured
through corruption of its agent.
It is submitted that since a contract providing for corruption is
completely ineffectual, neither party can claim any remedy,
contractual or restitutionary, in respect of the same. This proposition
is backed by the doctrine of clean hands, or ex turpi causa non oritur
actio, and therefore, “claims tainted by wrongdoing will not
succeed, and the loss lies where it falls.”82 The idea is simple: a
person cannot expect the court to come to his rescue when his own
conduct is bereft of good faith and righteousness. But what would
be the fate of the claims where the contract is procured by
corruption? One option could be that such contract must suffer from
the same consequences, for the idea is not to protect the parties but
to secure public interest in detection and prevention of corruption in
all its forms. The authors consider this to be too harsh for the
innocent party. After rescission of the contract, the innocent party
may claim restitutio in integrum, so that it is restored to the position
it would have occupied if the contract had not been performed.83 The
CORRUPTION ¶ 63 (1999) (“[I]n most European countries, the contract the cause
of which is illegal is null and void.”).
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2010 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
also lend support to this view.84 However, care should be taken that
such party is not left overcompensated, for it would mean taking
advantage of the illegality of the contract.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion brought to light that the issue of
corruption is marred by complexity as it raises tensions between
public policy matters in respect to which it is difficult to strike a
balance. The authors proposed that even though corruption is subject
to significant condemnation and abhorrence, it should be within an
arbitrator’s authority to adjudicate upon such allegations. Indeed,
cross-border business transactions would suffer a setback if such
issues are kept out of the scope of arbitration. We also examined the
problems that arise with respect to both burden of proof and standard
of proof, as it is difficult to uncover and establish corruption because
of the systematic manner in which it is carried out in most cases. An
attempt was made to show that it is within the power of an arbitrator
to initiate a sua sponte investigation to unravel corruption when
circumstances so warrant, for an arbitrator cannot be expected to
remain a silent spectator to unscrupulous dealings. Further, we
explored the consequences that a finding of corruption would bring,
by making a distinction between contracts aimed at corruption and
ones obtained by corruption, and arguing that in the latter case, since
one of the parties is innocent, restitution may be granted if it is
reasonable under the circumstances.
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